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Unidentified Orbital Debris: 
The Case for a Market-Share 
Liability Regime 
BYMARKJ. SUNDAHL, PH.D.* 
Introduction 
We stand today on the threshold of a new space age. Public 
interest in space activity is strong and signs of vitality in space are 
everywhere.1 The Space Shuttle continues to fly regularly, NASA's 
program to explore Mars has been aggressive, and the construction of 
the International Space Station has commenced.2 Private industry 
also has a firm first foothold in space. Telecommunication 
companies, for example, plan to envelop the Earth with satellite 
constellations in order to make global wireless broadband Internet 
access a practical reality.3 With the development of a reusable launch 
vehicle, the cost of achieving orbit will fall and the full vigor of the 
free market will be unleashed.4 At that point, various space 
* J.D. candidate, Hastings College of the Law, 2001; Ph.D. (Classics), Brown 
University, 2000; B.A., University of California, Los Angeles, 1993. I would like to 
extend my gratitude to Professor Dr. Walter Flury of the European Space Agency for 
providing me with the most recent scientific data on space debris. My thanks also go 
to Scott Blumin for encouraging me to pursue my vision of the new space age. I 
dedicate this Note to my wife and friend, Ms. Angela Bailey-Sundahl. 
1. See Mars Trip is Declared a Success, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1997, Metro, at 1. 
The NASA webcast of the Mars rover mission in 1997 was "the largest Internet event 
in the history of the world." Id. 
2 See Mission to Mars Gives New Life to Space Program, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 
1997, Late Ed. (Final), at A2. Admittedly, the string of NASA missions to Mars have 
included some embarrassing failures. See Usha Lee McFarling, NASA Failures 
Blamed on Policies, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2000, at A3. Despite these setbacks, NASA 
plans to persevere in the exploration of Mars. See Keay Davidson, Bouncing Back, 
NASA Plans Mars Mission, S.F. EXAMINER, July 28, 2000, at A15. 
3. See ESA SPACE DEBRIS MITIGATION HANDBOOK, at 4.2-1, European Space 
Agency (Release 1.0, 1999) [hereinafter ESA HANDBOOK]. 
4. A reusable launch vehicle, or RLV, does not rely on disposable rocket 
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industries, such as meteor mining, zero gravity manufacturing, and 
tourism, will emerge.5 
Our fledgling space industry, however, faces a grave danger. The 
volume of orbital debris has become so great that collisions are 
already commonplace. As the debris population continues to grow, 
the costs resulting from collisions will eventually smother the 
industry. 
The most effective way to protect the space industry from the 
crushing costs of orbital debris is to internalize the costs so that those 
who are responsible for creating the hazard pay for any damage to 
innocent parties. This internalization can be achieved by assigning 
liability to those responsible for creating the debris. The United 
Nations Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by 
Space Objects (Liability Convention) already internalizes some 
debris-related costs by means of a fault-based liability regime for 
damage caused by space objects.6 The Convention only partially 
succeeds in internalizing debris-related costs, however, because its 
provisions only reach damage caused by larger pieces of debris.7 The 
scope of the Liability Convention is limited in this way because the 
fault standard requires that the owner of the harmful space object be 
identified. Identification, in turn, requires that the debris fragment be 
boosters to break free of Earth's gravitational pull, as does the Space Shuttle. The 
mass-production of RLVs may be close at hand due to the establishment of the X­
Prize, a privately funded contest which offers an award in excess of ten million dollars 
to the inventor of the first RLV. See X PRIZE Foundation, X-Prize Homepage 
(visited Mar. 5, 2000) <http://www.xprize.org>. Eighteen teams from around the 
world have entered the competition and a winner is on the horizon. See id. The 
aerospace establishment as well as entrepreneurs unaffiliated with the X-Prize have 
also taken up the RLV challenge. See Erick Schonfeld, Going Long, FORTUNE, Mar. 
20, 2000, at 172-92. Lockheed, for example, has developed a prototype RLV called 
the X-33. See id. at 174. 
Some private companies, including Martin Marrieta, General Dynamics, 
McDonnell Douglas, and Space Services of Texas, already provide limited space 
delivery services. See Christopher Myers and Jonathan Ball, Trends in Commercial 
Space 1996: Space Transportation (visited Mar. 3, 2000) 
<http://www.ta.doc.gov/space/tics/spctrans.htm>. 
5. See Schonfeld, supra note 4, at 174, 179. In fact, space tourism has already 
begun. See Former JPL Scientist to Visit Mir Space Station as Tourist, L.A. TIMES, 
June 17, 2000, at B7. The first space tourist, Dennis Tito, will pay approximately 
twenty million dollars to spend ten days on the rehabilitated Mir space station, now 
owned by the Dutch company MirCorp. See id. 
6. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 
art. III, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.l.A.S. No. 7762, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 
[hereinafter Liability Convention]. 
7. See discussion infra Part III. 
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continuously tracked from Earth throughout its orbital lifetime. 
Currently, however, governments only track debris fragments with a 
diameter over ten centimeters.8 Smaller fragments are not tracked 
and therefore nobody can be held liable for any damage caused by 
these fragments. This problem of identification is a very serious 
matter because small objects make up by far the largest and most 
dangerous class of debris. These objects already number in the 
trillions and are ever increasing. 
Market-share liability solves the unidentified orbital debris 
problem. Market-share liability has been successfully applied in 
situations where several parties contribute to a dangerous condition 
but where no clear causal link ties a particular party to the harm 
caused by the condition. This solution has been proposed by a 
handful of commentators over the years but no mechanism for 
imposing market-share liability in outer space has yet been devised. 
This Note explores the threat of unidentified orbital debris and 
proposes a mechanism for imposing a form of market-share liability. 
Part I describes the nature of the unidentified debris threat. Part II 
describes how various agencies track debris and explains the 
limitations of debris identification. Part III discusses international 
law relevant to space debris.9 Part IV exposes the weaknesses of 
some previously proposed solutions to the unidentified debris 
problem. Part V argues that market-share liability is the best way to 
internalize the costs of unidentified debris damage. Finally, Part VI 
proposes an amendment to the Liability Convention that applies 
market-share liability to damage caused by unidentified orbital 
debris. 
This Note comes on the heels of UNISPACE III, the third 
annual conference of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS), which took place in July 1999.10 
At the meeting, the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee made 
public the fruits of a five-year study of the orbital debris problem.11 In 
8. See discussion infra Part II. 
9. See generally Howard A. Baker, Space Debris: Law and Policy in the United 
States, 60 U. COLO. L. R.Ev. 55 (1989) (discussing United States space law and policy); 
see also Jennifer M. Seymour, Containing a Cosmic Crisis: A Proposal for Curbing 
the Perils ofSpace Debris, 10 GEO. INT'L ENVrL. L. R.Ev. 891, 903-06 (1998). 
10. See U.N. Office of Outerspace Affairs, UN/SPACE Ill Homepage (visited 
Mar. 4, 2000) <http://www.un.org/events/unispace31>. 
11. See TECHNICAL REPORT ON SPACE DEBRIS, Scientific and Technical 
Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
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April 1999, the European Space Agency also released a detailed 
study of space debris and debris mitigation.12 These new studies will 
provide the technical foundation for the next generation of orbital 
debris scholarship. I was fortunate to have access to these sources 
while writing this Note. 
I. The Nature of the Debris Threat 
The United Nations will only address the unidentified debris 
problem when the international community is convinced that space 
debris poses a significant threat to our future in space. This Part 
describes the current state of the debris problem and explains how 
this problem, if ignored, will eventually reach crisis levels. 
A. The Debris Population 
The phrase "space debris" refers to all non-functional man-made 
space objects.13 There are four categories of debris: (1) inactive 
payloads, (2) operational debris, (3) fragmentation debris, and ( 4) 
microparticulate debris.14 Inactive payloads are defunct satellites that 
drift through space.15 Operational debris includes anything released 
into space during the course of a mission, such as spent rocket stages, 
exploding bolts, and lens caps ejected prior to camera operation.16 
Fragmentation debris, which makes up the greatest segment of the 
debris population, consists of fragments born of collisions and 
explosions.11 Microparticulate debris consists largely of paint chips 
from deteriorating surfaces and particles created by the burning of 
solid rocket fuels.18 
Debris can also be divided into three size groups: (1) "large" 
Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/720 [hereinafter TECHNICAL REPORT]. 
12. ESA HANDBOOK, supra note 3. 
13. See TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 2. The Technical Subcommittee 
for UNCOPUOS defines debris as including "all man-made objects, including their 
fragments and parts, whether their owners can be identified or not, in Earth orbit or 
re-entering the dense layers of the atmosphere that are non-functional with no 
reasonable expectation of their being able to assume or resume their intended 
functions or any other functions for which they are or can be authorized." Id. 
14. See Seymour, supra note 9, at 893; see also Delbert D. Smith, The Technical, 
Legal, and Business Risks ofOrbital Debris, 6 N.Y.U. ENV'TL. L.J. 50, 52 (1997). . 
15. See id. 
16. See id. 
17. See id.; see also ESA HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 2.2-1to2.2-4 (cataloguing 
144 known space object fragmentations caused by explosions and collisions). 
18. See id. 
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objects with a diameter over ten centimeters, (2) "medium" objects 
with a diameter between ten centimeters and one millimeter, and (3) 
"small" objects less than one millimeter in diameter.19 As a result of 
the almost 3900 space missions launched since 1957,20 there are now 
approximately 15,100 "large" pieces of debris adrift in Low Earth 
Orbit (LE0).21 Smaller debris is far more numerous: tens of millions 
of "medium" -sized pieces of debris float in space while trillions of 
"small" pieces wash across the orbits like waves of sand.22 
Medium and small fragmentation debris is particularly dangerous 
because this debris typically travels much faster than large debris and 
can be shot in any direction by the explosive force of a collision.23 An 
individual piece of debris may reach speeds up to fifteen kilometers 
per second (54,000 kilometers per hour).24 At this speed, a fragment 
the size of a bullet could torpedo a space station or destroy a 
satellite.25 A much smaller fragment would easily pierce an 
astronaut's suit.26 Even small particles traveling at a relatively low 
speed can over time degrade the surfaces of spacecraft components.27 
Disturbingly, ninety-nine percent of all orbital debris is composed of 
this deadlier class of debris with a diameter under ten centimeters.28 
B. The Risk of Collision 
Any spacecraft that spends a significant amount of time in orbit 
will inevitably collide with some type of debris.29 A partial list of 
19. See Peter J. Limperis, Orbital Debris and the Spacefaring Nations, 15 ARIZ. J. 
!NT'L& COMP. LAW319, 322 (1998). 
20. See ESA HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 2.0-1. 
21. See id. at 2.4-1. The Low Earth Orbit (LEO) is the most heavily utilized 
orbit. Objects in LEO orbit between 200 kilometers and 2000 kilometers above the 
surface of the earth. In Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO), spacecraft typically 
orbit approximately 36,000 kilometers above the earth. Objects in GEO have orbital 
periods of twenty-four hours, matching the Earth's rotational period, which allows 
them to remain constantly positioned within view of a chosen point on earth, such as 
a communications station. See Limperis, supra note 19, at 320-21. 
22. See ESA HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 2.4-1. 
23. See id. at 2.4-3. 
24. See id. at 9.0-1. 
25. See Richard Berkley, Space Law Versus Space Utilization: The Inhibition of 
Private Industry in Outer Space, 15 WIS. INT'L L.J. 421, 431 (1997); see also Seymour, 
supra note 9, at 896. 
26. Seeid. 
27. See Limperis, supra note 19, at 328. 
28. See Seymour, supra note 9, at 910 n.146. 
29. See Limperis, supra note 19, at 326. The probability of collision is a function 
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orbital collisions and near collisions involving debris shows that the 
danger is real:30 
1. 	 In July 1996, a fragment of the European Ariane rocket struck 
the French Cerise spy satellite.31 
2. 	 Damage to Japan's Midori satellite was likely to have been 
caused by debris.32 
3. 	 The Space Shuttle has had 27 windows damaged by debris 
during 18 flights.33 
4. 	 In 1998, orbital debris destroyed the expended third stage of a 
Minuteman 2 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).34 
5. 	 The Hubble telescope's solar panels have been pierced 
numerous times by debris.35 
6. 	 The Space Shuttle took evasive maneuvers to avoid debris on 
seven missions.36 
7. 	 In 1997, both the ERS-1 satellite and the CNES spacecraft 
SPOT-2 were forced to maneuver in order to avoid collision 
with debris.37 
8. 	 Debris detectors placed in orbit to test debris density have 
shown many thousands of craters.38 
9. 	 Various other retrieved space objects have shown debris-
related degradation.39 
This list includes only those episodes which are known to have 
involved debris. The unexplained malfunctions of a great number of 
satellites may well have been caused by debris damage.40 Perhaps the 
of the surface area of the spacecraft, its altitude, and the time it spends in space. 
30. 	 Additional collisions are listed at TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 9. 
31. 	 See ESA HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 2.2-1. 
32. 	 See Limperis, supra note 19, at 319. 
33. 	 See Seymour, supra note 9, at 896; see also Smith, supra note 14, at 53-54. 
34. 	 See Seymour, supra note 9, at 896. 
35. 	 See TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 10; see also Smith, supra note 14, at 
50. 
36. See ESA HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 8.0-1. The Space Shuttle has had to 
engage in evasive maneuvers approximately once every ten missions. 
37. 	 See id. 
38. These debris detectors include the NASA Long-Duration Exposure Facility, 
or LDEF (which showed over 30,000 penetrations) and the Mir Environmental 
Effects Payload, or MEEP. See NASA, SETAS Homepage (visited Mar. 4, 2000) 
<http://setas-www.larc.nasa.gov>. 
39. 	 See TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 9. 
40. See Seymour, supra note 9, at 896; see also James P. Lampertius, The Need for 
an Effective Liability Regime for Damage Caused by Debris in Outer Space, 13 MICH. 
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most telling indication of the high probability of collision is the 
prediction made by NASA that the International Space Station 
stands a one-in-five chance of being critically damaged by debris 
during its first ten years in orbit.41 
Not only is the threat posed by orbital debris real, but it is also 
increasing. Debris volume has grown by three to five percent every 
year and will continue to increase due to vigorous space activity.42 
One project that promises to add considerably to orbital congestion is 
the proposed deployment of multiple satellite constellations to 
optimize wireless global communication.43 The proposed Teledesic 
constellation will surround the Earth with 288 satellites.44 Fourteen 
other constellation projects have been proposed by companies such as 
Hughes and General Electric.45 These projects could add 
approximately 700 new satellites to "regions of peak debris density."46 
The effect on the orbital debris threat will be two-fold. First, the 
placement of more satellites in the path of orbital debris will increase 
the probability of collision. Second, the deployment of these 
constellations will itself increase the debris population by creating 
operational debris and, if any mishaps occur, fragmentation debris. 
Computer-modeling programs predict that even if only a fraction of 
the proposed constellation projects are successfully implemented, the 
number of catastrophic collisions in orbit will triple by the year 2050.47 
The United States government also intends to accelerate the 
testing of its orbital missile interception system, known as the 
National Missile Defense.48 When conducting these tests, the 
government first launches an ICBM.49 A second rocket is then 
J. INT'LL. 447, 458 (1992). 
41. See Limperis, supra note 19, at 326. NASA intends to employ over two 
hundred shields to protect the space station from debris. See TECHNICAL REPORT, 
supra note 11, at 35. 
42. See Smith, supra note 14, at 53. 
43. See ESA HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 4.2-1. 
44. Seeid. 
45. See id. at 4.2-3. 
46. Id. at 4.2-1. 
47. See id. at 4.2-2. 
48. See Seymour, supra note 9, at 893-94, 903 n.92; Lampertius, supra note 40, at 
462. 
49. See Seymour, supra note 9, at 893-94, 903 n. 92; see also Robert Bums, 
Crucial Anti-Missile Defense Test Today, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 18, 2000, at A4; Jim 
Abrams, House Backs Missile Defense System, Sends Bill to Clinton, BOSTON GLOBE, 
May 21, 1999, at A15. 
132 Hastings Int'! & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 24:125 
launched that carries the experimental exoatmospheric kill vehicle 
(EKV) into orbit. As the rocket nears the target missile, the EKV is 
released and collides with the ICBM in orbit.50 The resulting 
explosion releases vast amounts of fragmentation debris. 
This increased space activity may bring about the most 
frightening future scenario of all: the Kessler effect, also known as the 
"cascade effect."51 The Kessler effect describes a point in time when 
the volume of space debris will become so great that one collision will 
trigger a cataclysmic chain of self-perpetuating collisions.52 These 
collisions will eventually produce an impenetrable cloud of 
fragmentation debris that will encase Earth. This is a worst case 
scenario that would make space travel, as one commentator has put 
it, "a thing of the past" and would obstruct our dream of colonizing 
outer space.53 If no concerted international action is taken to reduce 
debris, it will only be a matter of time before the critical volume is 
reached. In the absence of aggressive debris reduction, critical mass 
will be achieved first in the highly congested LE0.54 Although 
computer modeling cannot generate precise predictions, critical mass 
in LEO may occur within the next one hundred years.55 Once 
collisions begin, it will be impossible to stop the chain reaction.56 In 
the event that cascading does occur, the use of space will be derailed 
for hundreds of years until the debris particles are eventually pulled 
into the Earth's atmosphere and vaporized.57 
II. Registration and Tracking: 
"Identified" vs. "Unidentified" Debris 
Debris is "identified" if the international community knows who 
is responsible for launching it into space. Identification requires that 
the launch of the object be duly registered and that the object be 
continuously tracked in orbit. Several powerful Earth-based tracking 
50. See Burns, supra note 49. 
51. ESA HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 4.6; see also Berkley, supra note 25, at 431; 
Seymour, supra note 9, at 914. 
52. See ESA HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 4.6. 
53. Seymour, supra note 9, at 914. 
54. See ESA HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 4.6-1. For a definition of LEO, see 
discussion supra note 21. 
55. See ESA HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 4.6-2. 
56. See id. at 4.6-1. 
57. See id. Orbital lifetimes in LEO can span several hundred years. 
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stations are currently tracking almost 10,000 objects in orbit.58 These 
stations use either optical technology, i.e. telescopes, or radar to track 
debris.59 Radar technology is superior to telescopes not only because 
radar is far more sensitive (and therefore allows detection of smaller 
debris) but also because radar, unlike telescopes, can operate during 
the day as well as during inclement weather.00 
The United States Space Command (USSP ACECOM) and its 
Russian counterpart have used tracking technology to catalogue 
space objects since Sputnik was launched in 1957.61 These entities, 
however, do not track debris smaller than ten centimeters in 
diameter.62 Therefore, the vast majority of space debris, which is 
composed of fragments less than ten centimeters in diameter, has 
been left "unidentified." 
This failure to track smaller objects cannot be attributed to a lack 
of technology. The United States government's Haystack, Haystack 
Auxiliary (HAX) and Goldstone radar facilities have the ability to 
detect debris as small as 5 millimeters in diameter in orbit 1000 
kilometers above Earth.63 The government entities have simply 
drawn the line at ten centimeters and do not track smaller objects. 
However, even if the United States government decided to use the 
HAX to track smaller objects, this would not necessarily mean that 
the government would be able to identify the "owners" of small 
debris. The origin of small debris is virtually impossible to determine 
because the fragments are typically created by explosions and 
collisions between larger debris in orbit. The orbits have become a 
soup of debris fragments that collide and create new smaller 
fragments which then shoot off in various directions. Keeping track 
of who owns each particle of debris would be a task of overwhelming 
complexity. As explained in the following section, this inability to 
identify the origin of smaller debris poses a serious challenge to the 
current international liability regime. 
58. See TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 5-8. 
59. See id. at 4, 7. 
60. See id. at 4, 6. 
61. See id. at 5. 

62 Seeid. 

63. See id. at 6-7. An experimental radar system under development in Germany 
may be able to detect objects in orbit that are no larger than a speck of dust. See id. 
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ID. Liability Under Current International Law 
Four international agreements govern outer space activities: 
(1) the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies64 (Outer Space Treaty), (2) the Agreement on the 
Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of 
Objects Launched into Space65 (Rescue and Return Agreement), 
(3) the Liability Convention, and ( 4) the Convention on Registration 
of Objects Launched into Outer Space66 (Registration Convention). 
As we shall see, the spirit of these agreements suggests that the 
launching state has perpetual responsibility for any damage caused by 
its space objects. Nevertheless, the current treaty regime fails to 
provide a fair compensation mechanism for damage caused by debris. 
This lacuna is most glaring with respect to damage caused by 
unidentified debris. 
The Outer Space Treaty was the international community's first 
effort to assign liability for space activities. Article VII states that 
"each state party to the treaty that launches or procures the launching 
of an object into outer space ... is internationally liable for damage 
[caused] by the object or its component parts."67 However, the 
absence of any clear standard of liability renders this provision so 
vague as to be practically worthless. The treaty also fails to create a 
procedural mechanism for seeking compensation.68 Another 
weakness, which recurs in later treaties, is the vague definition of 
"space object." This term may only encompass active spacecraft and 
satellites while excluding defunct objects such as debris.69 On the 
other hand, commentators have argued convincingly that the term 
"object" has a broader meaning that may include man-made debris 
64. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 
1967, 18 U.S.T 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space 
Treaty]. 
65. Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the 
Return of Objects Launched into Space, April 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, T.I.A.S. No. 
6599, 672 U.N.T.S. 119 [hereinafter Rescue and Return Agreement]. 
66. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14, 
1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, T.I.A.S. No. 8480, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Registration 
Convention]. 
67. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 64, art. VII. 
68. See Limperis, supra note 19, at 330. 
69. See id. at 333. 
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because the provision mentions "component parts."70 Despite the 
vague nature of the liability provision, it does give the impression that 
a launching state should be perpetually liable for any and all damage 
caused by its space objects.71 
Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty also requires states to avoid 
"harmful contamination" of outer space.72 This provision reveals an 
international awareness that space use could cause hazardous 
environmental conditions, such as debris pollution, and suggests that 
the launching state is responsible for reducing these hazards. 
Similarly, the Rescue and Return Agreement requires a state "to take 
effective steps ... to eliminate possible danger of harm [by its space 
objects when they are returned to Earth]."73 Although this obligation 
does not extend to objects still in space, the provision suggests that 
states have a continuing responsibility for defunct objects.74 
The Liability Convention was enacted in 1972 to elaborate on the 
extent and nature of a state's liability for damage caused by its space 
objects. The liability scheme imposed by the Convention has two 
prongs: Article II renders a state strictly liable for all damage caused 
by its space objects that occurs either on Earth or in airspace, while 
Article III creates fault-based liability for all damage that occurs in 
orbit.75 The Convention also provides that the injured state can 
submit a claim for damages directly to the launching state.76 If the 
states fail to reach a resolution, Article XIV calls for the appointment 
of a Claims Commission to arbitrate the matter.77 
The Liability Convention has a number of weaknesses which 
have been addressed in recent legal literature. First, it is still not clear 
that "space object" includes debris and therefore the question 
remains whether the Convention extends to damage caused by orbital 
debris.78 The definition of "space object" provided in Article I, 
70. Smith, supra note 14, at 55. 
71. See id. at 57. 
72. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 64, art. IX. 
73. Rescue and Return Agreement, supra note 65, art. V. 
74. See Seymour, supra note 9, at 899-900. 
75. Liability Convention, supra note 6, arts. II, III. Article III states that "[i]n the 
event of damage being caused elsewhere than on the surface of the earth to a space 
object of one launching State or to persons or property on board such a space object 
of another launching State, the latter shall be liable only if the damage is due to its 
fault or the fault of persons for whom it is responsible." Id. art. III. 
76. Id. art. IX. 
77. Id. art. XIV. 
78. See Limperis, supra note 19, at 331. 
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however, includes "component parts of a space object."79 This 
language may support an interpretation bringing debris damage 
within the scope of the Convention.80 Second, the Convention lacks a 
clear standard of care for determining when a state would be liable 
for damage.81 The vague wording of the Convention leaves 
unanswered certain questions regarding the duty of the launching 
state and how a breach of that duty would occur.82 For example, 
would the launching state be liable if damage to a third party results 
from the launching state's failure to follow construction guidelines?83 
And is the fault standard objective or subjective?84 The third and 
most troublesome flaw, a flaw which this Note attempts to cure, is the 
Convention's failure to assign fault in those cases where the 
destructive object cannot be identified.85 This issue is the sword onto 
which the Liability Convention will ultimately fall. Unidentified 
debris poses the greatest risk of damage in outer space and yet the 
Convention provides no compensation to its victims.86 
The Registration Convention makes the fault-based liability 
scheme more effective by aiding in the identification of space objects. 
Article II requires states to keep a registry of all objects launched into 
space. 87 In theory, powerful tracking systems will then keep track of 
registered objects after launch. Thus, any objects involved in an 
orbital collision will be instantly identifiable and the party "at fault" 
will be liable. The Convention also urges states with tracking 
capabilities to assist others in tracking their space objects.88 
Unfortunately, compliance with the convention has been poor.89 A 
larger problem is that these provisions help assign liability only 
insofar as an object can be tracked and, as explained above, most 
orbital debris cannot be tracked.90 Therefore the Liability 
Convention, even when assisted by the provisions of the Registration 
79. Liability Convention, supra note 6, art. L 
80. See Berkley, supra note 25, at 440. 
81. See Lampertius, supra note 40, at 456-57. 
82. See id. at 456. 
83. See Smith, supra note 14, at 58. 
84. See Lampertius, supra note 40, at 456. 
85. See id. at 455. 
86. See id. at 459. 
87. Registration Convention, supra note 66, art. IL 
88. Id. art. IV. 
89. See Lampertius, supra note 40, at 460. 
90. See discussion supra Part IL 
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Convention, does not provide a compensatory mechanism for damage 
caused by unidentified debris. 
IV. Two Previously Proposed Solutions: 
Insurance and the Liability Pool 
As the damage caused by unidentified orbital debris increases, 
the cost of space use will increase correspondingly. If international 
law does not allocate this cost to the responsible parties, the injured 
parties will be forced to absorb the cost. At some point, this cost will 
be so great that space ventures will become prohibitively expensive 
and any hope of private industry in space will evaporate. The 
challenge is to design a mechanism for internalizing the cost of 
unidentified debris so that the burden on innocent space venturers is 
lifted and private industry can flourish. In addition to market-share 
liability, which will be discussed in the next section, legal 
commentators have proposed two mechanisms for providing 
compensation to parties damaged by unidentified orbital debris: (1) 
insurance, and (2) a "liability pool." Neither of these mechanisms, 
however, provides an acceptable solution to the debris problem. 
The less attractive of the proposed solutions is insurance.91 
Insurance could be purchased to cover any damage caused by 
unidentified debris. This is a palatable solution for the time being 
since the risk may be spread, for instance, among a number of 
satellite owners. As long as the pool of insured satellite owners is 
large enough, the insurance premiums will be affordable. However, 
as the debris population grows, the premiums will rise with the 
probability of collision. Eventually, the insurance premium itself will 
become a significant barrier to entering the space industry. More 
importantly, the insurance solution is unsatisfactory because it does 
not internalize the cost of harm caused by debris but only spreads the 
cost among the parties at risk.92 
Commentators have also proposed the creation of an 
international compensation fund, or "liability pool."93 Each launching 
entity would contribute to the fund in proportion to the amount of 
debris that its mission would be likely to create. The fund would then 
91. See Smith, supra note 14, at 64-66. 

92 See id. (synopsis of various satellite insurance provisions). 

93. Lawrence D. Roberts, Addressing the Problem of Orbital Space Debris: 
Combining International Regulatory and Liability Regimes, 15 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. 
REV. 51, 70 (1992). 
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be used to pay compensation for any damage caused by unidentified 
orbital debris. While this solution does internalize the costs of debris, 
it does so imperfectly due to the impossibility of determining prior to 
launch how much debris an individual mission will create. There are 
many unforeseen events that may result in debris creation. For 
example, a navigator on Earth may make an error when guiding a 
satellite to its orbit. If a collision results and thousands of new debris 
fragments are created, according to the per-launch schema, the 
company will not have to pay more into the fund at that point. 
Therefore, the cost of that new hazard created by the collision is not 
internalized. It is also unfair to charge a launching entity for damage 
which has not yet, and may never, occur. For example, a given 
company may launch, operate, and then retrieve a satellite without 
the creation of any significant amounts of debris. That company 
would have already paid into the liability pool even though it 
ultimately made no contribution to the debris hazard. 
Furthermore, if instituted now, a liability pool funded by a per­
launch fee would be sorely underfunded for many years to come. It 
would take several years for the pool to collect the funds needed to 
meet the demands for compensation. If a string of collisions were to 
occur early on, the fund would be quickly depleted. One 
commentator has suggested that contributions for prior space 
pollution should be demanded from the United States government 
and other polluters in order to build a sufficient pool of funds 
quickly.94 Such a request would most likely be rejected out of hand. 
V. Market-Share Liability as a Solution 
Market-share liability provides the only fair and effective 
solution to the unidentified debris problem.95 This theory of liability, 
which was created in the context of a pharmaceutical case in 1980 by 
the California Supreme Court,96 holds each party liable in proportion 
to its contribution to the dangerous condition.97 The application of 
this theory of liability to the unidentified debris problem was first 
94. See id. 
95. See generally GLENN H. REYNOLDS & ROBERT P. MERGES, OUTER SPACE: 
PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY 177 (1989); Lampertius, supra note 40, at 466; 
Roberts, supra note 93, at 70-73; Berkley, supra note 25, at 440; Limperis, supra note 
19, at 339-41. 
96. See Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 
(1980). 
97. See discussion infra Part V.A. 
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proposed in 1989 by Professors Glenn Reynolds and Robert Merges.98 
Recently, this idea has enjoyed a resurgence in space debris 
scholarship. Two articles published in 1992 touted the idea as a 
possible solution to the unidentified debris problem.99 In 1997, 
Richard Berkley again put forth market-share liability as a potential 
solution.100 Most recently, Peter Limperis made a forceful argument 
for the application of market-share liability to orbital debris.101 
Despite the popularity of market-share liability, none of the 
commentators mentioned above has explored the feasibility of 
applying the theory to orbital debris. 
A. A BriefHistory ofMarket-Share Liability 
Market-share liability first emerged in a tort case in which the 
plaintiffs suffered harmful side effects from diethylstilbesterol (DES), 
a synthetic form of estrogen.102 During the thirty-year period between 
1941and1971, the drug was administered to pregnant women for the 
purpose of preventing miscarriage.103 Over two hundred 
pharmaceutical companies manufactured the drug during this 
period.104 It was later discovered that women whose mothers had 
ingested DES suffered a high incidence of vaginal and cervical cancer 
as a side effect of the drug.105 However, due to the passage of time 
and, more importantly, due to the fungible nature of the product, the 
victims were unable to identify the specific manufacturer that 
produced the pills prescribed to their mothers.106 Because the pills 
were perfectly substitutable, pharmacists routinely filled prescriptions 
for DES with pills produced by any of the two hundred 
manufacturers.107 This inability to create a clear causal link between 
the harm and a particular manufacturer raised a new challenge for the 
California Supreme Court. 
The court in Sindell first considered, but ultimately rejected, 
98. See REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 95, at 177. 
99. Lampertius, supra note 40, at 466; Roberts, supra note 93, at 70-73. 
100. See Berkley, supra note 25, at 440. 
101. See Limperis, supra note 19, at 339-41. 
102. See Sindel!, 26 Cal. 3d at 593. 
103. Seeid. 
104. See id. at 602. 
105. See id. at 594. 
106. See id. at 595, 610. 
107. See id. at 595. 
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three traditional tort theories of multiple causation.108 The first of 
these theories was "alternative liability," which had been espoused 
previously by the court in Summers v. Tice. 109 In Summers, the 
plaintiff had been hit by buckshot after two hunters fired shotguns 
simultaneously in his direction.110 Because both defendants were 
negligent and both were in a better position than the plaintiff to 
determine who fired the harmful bullet, the court shifted the burden 
to the defendants to absolve themselves of blame individually.111 
Under this theory, if the defendants are unable to isolate the liable 
party, all defendants are held jointly and severally liable.112 
The court in Sindel! refused to apply alternative liability to the 
DES situation for two reasons. First, the drug manufacturers had no 
special information that would have given them an advantage over 
the plaintiffs in determining which company had made the pills 
ingested by each plaintiff's mother.113 Second, the probability that an 
individual drug manufacturer had actually produced the drug ingested 
by each plaintiffs mother was very low, unlike the situation in 
Summers where a fifty percent probability existed that each of the 
defendants had fired the harmful bullet.114 Therefore, the court 
concluded that it would be unfair to hold a company jointly liable for 
harm it most likely did not cause.115 
The second approach rejected by the court in Sindel! was the 
theory of "concert of action liability."116 Under this theory, multiple 
tortfeasors can be held jointly liable for the actions of the group if 
they collaborated, either expressly or implicitly, in committing a 
tortious act, or else knowingly provided substantial assistance in the 
commission of the tort.117 The court found no such collaboration or 
common plan among the various drug manufacturers and rejected 
this theory of liability.118 
Finally, the court in Sindel! refused to find the defendants liable 
108. Id. at 598-610. 
109. Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948). 
110. Id. at 82. 
111. See id. at 86. 
112. See id. at 88. 
113. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 601. 
114. Id. at 602-03. 
115. See id. at 603. 
116. Id. at 603-06. 
117. See id. at 604. 
118. See id. at 605. 
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under the theory of "enterprise liability."119 Enterprise liability, also 
known as "industry-wide liability," requires that each of the 
manufacturers follow the safety guidelines issued by a central trade 
association.120 In such cases, the individual manufacturers in effect 
shift their responsibility for ensuring the safety of their product onto 
the trade organization.121 When such an organization is negligent in 
the formulation of safety standards and these inadequate standards 
result in the production of goods that cause harm, each of the 
manufacturers is held jointly liable.122 However, because no such 
centralized trade organization existed in the DES industry, the court 
in Sindell dismissed this theory of liability.123 
Having rejected these traditional theories of liability, yet being 
umvilling to let the victims go uncompensated, the court decided to 
create a novel tort theory. The court explained that the realities of 
the modem marketplace, replete with fungible products, demanded a 
new theory of liability that would permit victim compensation 
without requiring the identification of a specific tortfeasor.124 Under 
this new theory, later dubbed "market-share liability," the court held 
that each of the drug manufacturers would be liable in proportion to 
their share of the DES market.125 Each company's resulting liability, 
the court reasoned, "would approximate its responsibility for the 
injury caused by its own products."126 The court permitted an 
individual defendant company to exculpate itself by proving that its 
prod!lct could not possibly have caused harm.121 In fact, one 
defendant in Sindell succeeded in exculpating itself by showing that it 
did not begin producing the drug until after the victims were born.128 
Since the decision by the California Supreme Court in Sindell, 
the high courts of several states have adopted market-share liability.129 
The high courts of Washington, New York and Florida applied 
119. Id. at 607-10. 
120. Id. at 607-08. 
121. See id. 

122 See id. 

123. Id. at 609. 
124. See id. at 610. 
125. See id. at 612. 
126. Id. 
127. Seeid. 
128. Id. In the DES cases, the victim was harmed as a fetus as a result of 
medication taken by the mother. 
129. See Christina Bohannan, Note, Product Liability: A Public Policy Approach 
to Contaminated Factor VIII Blood Products, 48 FLA. L. REV. 263, 284 n.146 (1996). 
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market-share liability in DES cases similar to Sindell.130 Taking 
market-share liability beyond the context of DES for the first time, 
Hawaii's Supreme Court adopted market-share liability to 
compensate plaintiffs who contracted the human immunodeficiency 
virus (HIV) from a tainted blood product manufactured by a number 
of companies.131 
When the Wisconsin Supreme Court was faced with a DES case, 
it ostensibly rejected market-share liability but then applied another 
theory of liability, "risk contribution liability," which differed only in 
name from market-share liability.132 The court held that a 
manufacturer of DES should be held liable for damages on the 
grounds that it had contributed to the risk posed by the drug.133 
Other jurisdictions have refused to accept market-share 
liability.134 The high courts of Missouri, Iowa, Illinois and Ohio have 
rejected market-share liability on the basis of one or more of the 
following criticisms: (1) the theory abolishes the common law 
requirement of a clear causal link, (2) the task of determining market­
share is difficult and can lead to the unfair apportionment of liability, 
and (3) market-share liability is a form of social engineering best left 
to the legislature.135 For the same reasons, the First and Third Circuits 
have refused to hold paint manufacturers liable under a market-share 
theory for brain damage in children caused by exposure to lead 
paint.136 
130. See id.; see also Martin v. Abbott Lab., 689 P.2d 368 (1984); Hymowitz v. Eli 
Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989); Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So. 2d 275 
(Fla. 1990). A federal court in Massachusetts has also applied market-share liability 
in a DES case. See McCormack v. Abbott Lab., 617 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Mass. 1985); 
see generally Andrew B. Nace, Note, Market Share Liability: A Current Assessment of 
a Decade-Old Doctrine, 44 VAND. L. REV. 395, 407 (1991). 
131. See Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 823 P.2d 717 (Haw. 1991); see also 
Bohannan, supra note 129, at 264-65, 284 n.146. 
132. Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37 (Wis. 1984); see also Suzanne Ernst 
Drummond, DES and Market Share Liability in Ohio-A Lesson in How What You 
Don't Know Can Hurt: Sutowski v. Eli Lilly, 696N.E.2d187 (Ohio 1998), 67 U. CrN. 
L. REV.1331, 1341-42 (1999). 
133. See Drummond, supra note 132, at 1341. 
134. See id. at 1342-43. 
135. See Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241, 244 (Mo. 1984); Mulcahy v. Eli 
Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67, 70(Iowa1986); Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324, 
328-29 (Ill. 1990); Sutowski v. Eli Lilly & Co., 696 N.E.2d 187, 190 (Ohio 1998); see 
also Drummond, supra note 132, at 1342-43; Kenneth R. Lepage, Lead-Based Paint 
Litigation And The Problem Of Causation: Toward A Unified Theory Of Market 
Share Liability, 37 B.C. L. REv.155, 175-76 (1995). 
136. See Santiago v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 782 F. Supp. 186, 188 (D. Mass. 1992), 
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Although market-share liability has been most successful in the 
context of DES cases, plaintiffs have made attempts to apply the 
theory to other areas of product liability. As mentioned above, the 
Hawaii Supreme Court adopted market-share liability to permit the 
recovery of damages for a tainted blood product. California has also 
applied the theory to allow compensation for victims of a defective 
polio vaccine.137 Efforts to extend market-share liability to health 
problems caused by asbestos and lead paint have failed so far.138 
Potential areas of tort litigation that may in the future lend 
themselves to market-share liability are cases targeting tobacco 
companies and gun manufacturers.139 One reason for the infrequent 
use of market-share liability outside of the DES cases is that truly 
fungible products are rare.140 
B. The Application ofMarket-Share Liability to Orbital Debris 
Orbital debris poses an unusual liability problem that resembles 
the challenge faced by the California Supreme Court in Sindel!. Like 
DES tablets, small fragments of space debris are indistinguishable, i.e. 
debris is fungible. When unidentified debris causes damage, the 
specific party responsible for producing the harmful debris fragment 
cannot be identified. As in the DES cases, the current debris threat 
demands a creative solution. The fault-based scheme of the Liability 
Convention may work in those instances when the debris is identified, 
but when the debris is untrackable, the owner cannot be identified, 
fault cannot be attributed, and thus liability cannot be assigned. A 
form of market-share liability, however, can circumvent this problem 
of identification.141 Under such a scheme, each launching entity, 
whether public or private, will be partially liable for any damage 
caused by unidentified debris in proportion to the percentage of the 
unidentified debris population for which it is responsible.142 
aff'd, 3 F.3d 546 (1st Cir. 1993); City of Philadelphia v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 994 F.2d 
112, 115 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Lepage, supra note 135. 
137. See Morris v. Parke, Davis & Co., 667 F. Supp. 1332 (C.D. Cal. 1987); see also 
Nace, supra note 130, at 416-18. 
138. See Nace, supra note 130, at 414-16; Lepage, supra note 135, at 175. 
139. See Robert L. Rabin, Enabling Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 452 (1999). 
140. See Nace, supra note 130, at 416 n.164. 
141. Perhaps "risk-contribution liability" would be a more appropriate name since 
there is no market in space debris. Nonetheless, I will use the phrase "market-share 
liability" for the sake of simplicity. 
142. See Limperis, supra note 19, at 340. 
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Who then would pay for damage caused by unidentified debris? 
Under the market-share scheme, the liability for such damage will fall 
almost exclusively on the United States and Russia for a long time to 
come. These states are the great pioneers in space use but they are 
also the primary contributors to the debris problem. The United 
States and Russia have sent over ninety percent of all catalogued 
space objects into orbit.143 The remaining portion is attributable to 
thirty-six other states and private entities.144 
The greatest obstacle to extending market-share liability to 
orbital debris is the difficulty in determining the contribution of each 
spacefaring state and private entity to the existing debris hazard. The 
total unidentified debris population can be estimated by sampling 
methods and mathematical models, but it is impossible to determine 
with any precision what portion of that population is attributable to 
the activities of a particular state. In the DES cases, the courts were 
able to calculate the market-share of each of the defendant drug 
manufacturers by simply measuring the volume of medication each 
defendant sold at the time the victims purchased the drug.145 Sales 
records provided fairly precise evidence of market-share. But even 
with the sales records in hand, the court in Sindell still showed some 
concern that exact calculation of market-share was not possible and 
might therefore lead to an unfair apportionment of liability.146 
Despite these misgivings, the court felt that the risk of unfairness was 
acceptable because the risk was, in essence, no different from the risk 
of misapportionment of liability that results when a jury is asked to 
determine liability in cases involving comparative fault.147 
When extending market-share liability to orbital debris, the 
central question is whether the risk of unfair apportionment of 
liability is too great. In other words, can a state's contribution to the 
unidentified debris hazard be calculated with acceptable accuracy? 
The answer is yes. Although it is impossible to identify the owner of 
each particle of debris, there are measurable indices that would allow 
us to approximate with some accuracy each state's contribution to the 
total unidentified debris population. The possible indices that might 
143. See ESA HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 2.1-3. For the sake of simplicity, this 
Note assumes that Russia will take responsibility for space debris created by the 
former U.S.S.R. 
144. See id. 
145. See, e.g., Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 612. 
146. Id. at 613. 
147. See id. 
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be used for this purpose are (1) the number of operational objects 
each state currently has in orbit, (2) the total number of objects each 
state has placed in orbit, and (3) the number of identified debris 
fragments currently in orbit for which each state is responsible. Of 
these three possible indices, we should use the one that would provide 
the most accurate estimate of each entity's contribution to the 
unidentified debris population. 
The first index, based on existing operational objects in orbit, 
bears virtually no relation to the unidentified debris population. If, 
for example, the United States were to deorbit all of its current 
spacecraft and satellites, it would own zero percent of the operational 
objects in orbit. If the operational vehicle index were then used to 
determine "market-share," the United States' market-share would be 
zero and the United States would thus be immunized from liability 
for unidentified debris damage. This would clearly be unfair because 
the United States is a primary contributor to space debris. 
The second option would give a more reliable indication of 
unidentified debris risk contribution. Because every mission creates 
debris and objects in LEO can remain in orbit for hundreds of years, 
the number of missions launched by each state since 1957 should, it 
seems, provide a fairly accurate indication of each state's contribution 
to orbital debris. This index, however, has two distinct flaws. First, 
not every space mission creates the same amount of debris. Second, it 
is difficult to determine how much of the debris created in the year 
1961, for instance, remains in orbit and how much has reentered 
Earth's atmosphere. Therefore, the number of missions launched has 
only a tenuous connection to the current debris population. 
The third possible index, based on the number of identified 
debris fragments currently in orbit, is the best indicator of 
unidentified debris market-share. Unidentified debris is composed 
largely of fragmentation debris created by the collision and explosion 
of larger debris bodies.148 Larger debris, in effect, becomes smaller 
debris. Therefore, if a state is responsible for creating a large portion 
of the known body of large debris, it is also likely that the same state 
is responsible for creating an equal portion of the unidentified debris 
fragments. 
Assuming that the third option is selected as the index of a state's 
contribution to the unidentified debris population, the remaining 
148. See discussion supra Part I.A. 
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steps for determining liability would be simple. The first step would 
be to determine each state's contribution to the identified debris 
population (hereinafter "contribution index") using current 
catalogues of identified debris. We would then assume that each state 
has contributed in the same proportion to the unidentified debris 
population. The USSPACECOM catalogue can provide the figures 
for these calculations.149 As of December 31, 1997, the catalogue 
showed that the total number of identified debris fragments was 
6186.150 Of these, the United States owned 3272 objects, which make 
up 52.9% of the total population, thus giving the United States a 
contribution index of 52.9%.151 Russia was identified as being 
responsible for 2526 fragments, or 40.8% of the total population.152 
Responsibility for the remaining 6.3% of the fragments was divided 
among ten other states and entities.153 
When unidentified debris causes damage in orbit, the 
contribution index of each state and private entity would be used to 
allocate liability. This process is straightforward: if a satellite suffers 
$10,000,000 of damage, the United States would be liable for 52.9% 
of the costs, or $5,290,000. Other states and private entities would be 
similarly liable in proportion to their share of the identified debris 
population. 
As in the DES cases, exculpation will be possible if a spacefaring 
state or private entity can prove that it could not possibly have 
produced the debris that caused the damage. Such exculpation would 
be difficult but is conceivable under certain circumstances. Imagine, 
for instance, that a space station was pierced by a large fragment of 
unidentified debris that left a hole half a meter wide. It would be 
clear that the fragment must have had a diameter of approximately 
fifty centimeters. A state that had sent only a few satellites into orbit 
and had closely tracked all pieces of its debris over ten centimeters 
would be able to exculpate itself by showing that the large debris for 
149. See ESA HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 2.1-3. 
150. See id. 
151. See id. 
152. See id. 
153. These ten states and entities are the ESA with 197 fragments (3.2% ), the 
People's Republic of China with 103 fragments (1.7% ), Japan with 58 fragments 
(0.9%), France with 16 fragments (0.3%), India with 4 fragments (<0.1 %), Italy with 
3 fragments ( <0.1 % ), Australia with 2 fragments ( <0.1 % ), Germany with 1 fragment 
( <0.1 % ), the United Kingdom with 1 fragment ( <0.1 % ), and Iridium with 1 fragment 
(<0.1 % ). See id. 
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which it was responsible was nowhere near the point of collision. 
This opportunity for exculpation will provide an additional incentive 
for states to track debris closely. States might also exculpate 
themselves by means of chemical analysis. This method would 
require that the damaged object be retrieved from space in order to 
test for any traces that the debris fragment may have left behind. 
These tests would reveal the exact chemical composition of the 
fragment. States could then exculpate themselves by showing that 
they had never launched anything made of that material into space. 
C. The Benefits ofMarket-Share Liability 
Market-share liability will benefit the space industry by (1) 
providing compensation to the injured party where none existed 
before, (2) creating an incentive for states to mitigate debris 
production, (3) creating an equal incentive to remove existing debris, 
(4) promoting the registration and tracking of space objects, (5) 
encouraging states to cooperate in the prevention of collisions, and 
(6) ultimately lowering the economic barrier to entering the space 
industry. 
The immediate benefit of market-share liability will be the 
creation of a compensation system where none now exists. Currently, 
the victims of unidentified debris damage must absorb the cost of any 
collision while the parties who created the debris incur no liability. A 
market-share liability amendment will fill this gap in the Liability 
Convention. 
Of greater importance in the long run is the fact that market­
share liability would create an incentive for states to reduce the 
production of large debris. The production of trackable debris will 
increase a state's contribution index and, hence, its liability exposure. 
Launching entities would therefore take measures to minimize large 
debris production in order to minimize liability. Venting excess fuel, 
for example, would reduce the risk of explosions in orbit.154 A state 
can also reduce its contribution index by deorbiting defunct satellites. 
This can be achieved by either retrieving the satellites or by 
propelling the "dead" satellites into the Earth's atmosphere so that 
they are vaporized.155 
Market-share liability will not only promote debris mitigation 
154. See Seymour, supra note 9, at 911. 
155. Seeid. 
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measures but also encourage the improvement of debris removal 
technologies. Entities will be able to reduce their contribution index, 
as explained above, by removing debris that is already in orbit. 
Currently, debris can be removed by sending the Space Shuttle to 
retrieve defunct satellites. Other options include using an Earth­
based laser to push objects out of their orbits so that they reenter the 
Earth's atmosphere and are destroyed. The Orion laser is currently 
being developed for this purpose by the United States government.156 
One commentator has even suggested using a "giant Nerf ball" to 
catch debris, in effect "sweeping" the orbits clean.157 Those states and 
private entities that do not have easy access to debris retrieval 
technology or do not have a laser of their own would be able to buy 
these services from the United States. 
The United States and Russia, as well as other states, would also 
have a two-fold incentive to improve their systems for registering, 
tracking, and cataloguing space objects. First, states would strive to 
improve their tracking capabilities so that they would be able to show 
that another state owned a specific debris fragment that caused 
damage. Once the responsible state is identified, only that state 
would be liable. Second, the United States and Russia would be 
eager to identify as many pieces of debris as possible that belong to 
each other. The United States, for example, would want to increase 
the number of catalogued fragments identified as Russian. By doing 
so, the Russian contribution index would grow and the contribution 
index of all other states would simultaneously fall. Improvements in 
tracking capabilities would be beneficial because they would allow a 
fairer apportionment of liability and would assist in debris evasion. 
Spacefaring states would also make efforts to improve debris 
evasion technology out of the fear of incurring liability. After all, the 
most effective method of avoiding liability is to ensure that collisions 
do not occur. More effective evasion capabilities could be achieved 
by establishing a communications system whereby states with tracking 
facilities, such as the United States, could warn other states when 
their satellites or spacecraft were in the path of approaching debris. 
Upon receiving this information, the spacecraft owner would be able 
to engage in evasive maneuvers. This warning system could make use 
156. See Smith, supra note 14, at 66-67. 
157. Seymour, supra note 9, at 908. The aerogel substance used in the MEEP 
program to capture debris may be suitable for this purpose although implementation 
of such a program would, at the moment, be prohibitively expensive. See id. 
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of sensitive ground-based debris detection technology as well as 
debris-detecting satellites.158 
Ultimately, market-share liability would lower the economic 
barrier to entering the space industry. The costs associated with 
unidentified debris damage would be reallocated to those who 
created the hazard. This internalization of costs would eliminate a 
burden which would otherwise crush private space ventures. The 
costs of engaging in the space industry would drop dramatically and 
the risks of debris-related damage would also become more 
predictable, thus allowing companies to plan confidently for the 
future.159 The private space industry would therefore be able to 
expand unfettered and the accompanying benefits of private 
enterprise would follow. 
D. The Weaknesses ofMarket-Share Liability 
Along with its many benefits, market-share liability would also 
present a number of challenges that may threaten its success. These 
challenges include (1) the creation of a perverse incentive to halt all 
debris tracking, (2) the possibility that the international community 
may consider market-share liability unfair, (3) the weak incentive to 
reduce small debris, ( 4) possible weaknesses in the incentive to 
mitigate the production of large debris, (5) the expense of debris 
mitigation measures, and (6) political opposition from the United 
States and Russia. Although this list is long, cogent counter­
arguments or simple solutions exist in each case. 
Using a state's contribution to the existing identified debris 
population as the index for determining liability may create a 
perverse incentive for states to scale down their debris tracking 
activities. Since liability would be tied to the number of debris 
fragments whose ownership is known, states may try to reduce their 
liability simply by halting their efforts to identify debris. However, 
because several nations would soon be engaged in debris detection, 
the desire of each of these states to increase the risk-contribution of 
other states (and thereby reduce their own contribution) would cause 
each of them to track each other's debris aggressively. The sum of 
this multinational effort would easily offset the perverse incentive to 
158. See TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 11. These debris detection 
satellites could use detection technology such as that currently employed by the MSX 
spacecraft which has already been placed into orbit by the United States. 
159. See Berkley, supra note 25, at 428. 
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reduce tracking one's own objects. 
The international community may also complain that market­
share liability is unfair because it relies on rough estimates of each 
state's contribution to the unidentified debris population. However, 
as discussed above, estimates of risk contribution based on certain 
indices will have to suffice and these estimates will probably be close 
enough to the real figures to avoid gross unfairness.1 Some countries (j() 
may also raise the objection that the market-share analysis does not 
take into account the possibility that naturally occurring meteoroids 
could have caused the damage. In response, proponents of market­
share theory can argue that it would be highly unlikely for an orbital 
collision to involve a meteoroid because meteoroids pass through the 
orbits very quickly before burning up in the Earth's atmosphere.161 
Opponents of market-share liability may also contend that the 
market-share scheme creates only a weak incentive to reduce 
unidentified debris, i.e. debris that is too small to track. Because a 
state's contribution index is based on the volume of identified debris 
created by that state, the creation of unidentified debris will not 
increase a state's liability exposure. Therefore, no incentive to 
mitigate small debris, such as paint chips or lens caps, will exist. In 
response to this complaint, one could argue that an incentive to 
reduce small debris will arise out of a state's desire to minimize the 
probability of future collisions for which it would be partly liable. 
Moreover, once tracking technology improves, it will become possible 
to assign ownership to smaller pieces of debris such as lens caps. At 
that point, an ejected lens cap will be catalogued as identified debris 
and will increase the launching state's contribution index. This will 
create an incentive to mitigate small debris. In the meantime, in 
order to ensure maximum reduction of small debris, the United 
Nations should require that states follow guidelines for mitigating 
operational and microparticulate debris.162 
Another potential problem with market-share liability stems 
from the fact that states and private entities that have contributed 
only a negligible amount to the debris population will continue to 
160. See discussion supra Part V.B. 
161. See Limperis, supra note 19, at 322; see also Seymour, supra note 9, at 893. 
162. The guidelines should require spacecraft to be designed in ways that minimize 
debris. The absence of paint on external surfaces, for example, would eliminate paint 
chipping. Using non-explosive bolts and carefully avoiding the ejection of objects 
into space would reduce operational debris. See Seymour, supra note 9, at 910; see 
also Smith, supra note 14, at 61. 
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have a very small contribution index for many years to come. The 
European Space Agency, for example, is responsible for only a small 
share of existing debris and this share will not increase by much until 
the agency launches hundreds of objects. Therefore, the European 
Space Agency would not have an incentive to make efforts to 
mitigate debris knowing that it would be liable for only a very small 
percentage of any damages awarded. Just as the risk contribution of 
smaller space programs will not increase, the contribution indices of 
the United States and Russia will remain high for years to come 
regardless of how much they try to mitigate debris. This might 
discourage these states from working to reduce debris since their 
current liability exposure will persist for years despite any efforts at 
mitigation. NASA may see little benefit in attempting to reduce 
debris and throw up its hands in frustration. Mandatory international 
guidelines for debris mitigation, however, would remedy this 
potential problem. 
Another danger is that certain states may decide that the current 
risk of collision is too small to warrant concern. As a result, these 
states may not be compelled by the fear of liability to mitigate debris 
production.163 This would again have the effect of transferring the 
costs of orbital debris onto future generations who will inevitably be 
harmed if current space users do not take remedial action. The 
international enforcement of debris mitigation guidelines will help to 
solve this problem by compelling debris reduction when the specter of 
potential liability is not enough. 
Although market-share liability would lower the barrier to 
market entry by reducing the costs related to debris damage, it may 
also create a new economic barrier by requiring companies to spend 
large amounts of money on debris mitigation.164 Companies would be 
compelled to implement debris mitigation techniques by either the 
fear of incurring liability or by the fact that mitigation would be 
required by supplemental laws. Designing satellites with debris­
minimizing features, such as special boosters to deorbit the satellite at 
the end of its lifespan, would place an extra financial burden on 
companies. It must be kept in mind, however, that the cost of 
mitigation measures is minor when compared to the future costs of 
frequent collisions that the space industry will have to face if no such 
measures are taken. 
163. See Roberts, supra note 93, at 71. 
164. See Smith, supra note 14, at 69-70. 
152 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 24:125 
The greatest threat to the implementation of market-share 
liability is sheer political opposition.165 If a number of satellites are 
destroyed by unidentified debris, the cost to the United States and 
Russia could easily run into the billions of dollars. Why then would 
these states ever agree to implement such a system? The answer to 
this lies once again in the benefits of private enterprise. If the United 
States and Russia agree to pay for their fair share of debris damage, it 
will allow private industry to thrive in space. The benefits resulting 
from the free market (lower prices, more reliable technology, etc.) 
would become available for the governments of the world to enjoy as 
much as for the private individual. The United States and Russian 
governments must look forward to the day when they will be able to 
lease space on a private orbiter at a reasonable rate. In this way, 
private enterprise will ultimately save these governments money. 
In the meantime, the United States and Russia may be required 
to pay large amounts in compensation for damage caused by orbital 
debris. A reorganization of the NASA budget would make this 
possible without placing any further economic burdens on the United 
States government. The government should begin to phase out 
portions of its orbital programs and allow private industry to take its 
place. The money that is now earmarked for the Space Shuttle and 
other programs should be used to pay for any debris damage suffered 
by private enterprises. We are at a crossroads in history when private 
industry must replace government in space. NASA and the Russian 
Space Agency have achieved a marvelous feat by opening space to 
humankind. Now it is time for these agencies to step aside and help 
private companies to take their place in space. 
VI. A Proposed Amendment to the Liability Convention 
In order to implement market-share liability for damage caused 
by unidentified debris, Article III of the Liability Convention must be 
amended. The following proposal for amending the convention 
imposes a market-share theory of liability and creates a mechanism 
for its implementation. The proposed definition of space debris is 
borrowed, with some modifications, from the Technical 
Subcommittee for UNCOPUOS.166 Proposed additions to Article III 
are in italics while strikethrough indicates deleted matter. 
165. See Limperis, supra note 19, at 342; REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 95, at 
177; Lampertius, supra note 40, at 466; Seymour, supra note 9, at 903. 
166. See supra note 13. 
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Article III 
J. In the event of damage being caused elsewhere than on the 
surface of the Earth to a space object of one launching State or to 
persons or property on board such a space object by an identified 
space object belonging to ef another launching State, the latter shall 
be liable only if the damage is due to its fault or the fault of persons 
for whom it is responsible. 
2. In the event of damage being caused elsewhere than on the 
surface of the Earth to a space object of one launching State or to 
persons or property on board such a space object by unidentified 
orbital debris, each spacefaring State will be liable for the damage in 
proportion to that State's recognized contribution to the total 
identified orbital debris population unless that State is able to 
exculpate itself 
3. For the purposes ofthis Article: 
(a) "Identified" means that the State responsible for placing the 
object in orbit is known; 
(b) "Unidentified" means that the State responsible for placing the 
object in orbit is not known; 
(c) "Debris" means all man-made objects, including their fragments 
and parts, whether their owners can be identified or not, that are non­
fu,nctional with no reasonable expectation of their being able to 
assume or resume their intended fu,nctions or any other fu,nctions for 
which they are or can be authorized; 
(d) A State's "recognized contribution to the total identified orbital 
debris population" will be calculated in accordance with the current 
combined space debris data provided by those States that track 
debris; 
(e) A State can "exculpate" itself by proving that the debris that 
caused the damage could not possibly have originated from any ofits 
space objects or missions. 
As discussed above, the United Nations should also adopt 
mandatory debris reduction regulations alongside the amendment in 
order to ensure maximum debris reduction.167 Such regulations 
should require that states (1) design spacecraft in accordance with 
debris mitigation guidelines, (2) use their best efforts to track and 
167. See discussion supra Part V.D. 
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identify debris, (3) warn other states when a collision risk arises, ( 4) 
vent excess fuels to reduce the probability of explosion, and (5) 
deorbit defunct objects.168 
Conclusion 
Space debris threatens our future in outer space. Thousands of 
fragments scream through the orbits at terrific speeds causing damage 
to operational satellites and spacecraft with ever-increasing 
frequency. This threat of expensive damage will stifle the growth of 
private industry in space unless companies are protected from the 
costs related to debris. The solution to this problem requires that 
these costs be internalized so that they are not borne by innocent 
parties. 
Internalization can be achieved by assigning liability to the party 
that created the harmful debris. The fault-based compensation 
mechanism adopted in the Liability Convention adequately assigns 
liability when identified debris causes damage, but the Convention 
fails to assign liability in cases where the debris is unidentified. 
Under the Convention, fault cannot be assigned unless the owner of 
the harmful debris is identified. This limitation leaves a gaping hole 
in the Convention because the vast majority of space debris eludes 
identification. 
To remedy this shortfall, this Note proposes an amendment to 
the Liability Convention that applies a form of market-share liability 
when unidentified debris causes damage in orbit. Under the 
amendment, each state would be liable for any damage caused by 
unidentified debris in proportion to its contribution to the debris 
hazard. Market-share liability would energize the private space 
industry by lowering the economic barrier to market entry. Although 
the costs of market-share liability would, at first, fall heavily on the 
governments of the United States and Russia, a robust private space 
industry would ultimately benefit the governments. Ultimately, 
market-share liability will allow private industry to usher in a new 
space age. 
168. The guidelines could be modeled on NASA's Guidelines and Assessment 
Procedures for Limiting Orbital Debris. For a description of NASA's guidelines see 
Seymour, supra note 9, at 905; see also supra note 162. 
